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Abstract 
This paper serves as an introduction to the special issue on “Reconciling Nature and 
Nurture in Behavior and Cognition Research” and sets its agenda to resolve the 
‘interactionist’ dichotomy of nature as the genetic, and stable, factors of development, 
and nurture as the environmental, and plastic influences. In contrast to this received view 
it promotes the idea that all traits, no matter how developmentally fixed or universal they 
seem, contingently develop out of a single-cell state through the interaction of a multitude 
of developmental resources that defies any easy, dichotomous separation. It goes on to 
analyze the necessary ingredients for such a radical, epigenetic account of development, 
heredity and evolution: 1. A detailed understanding of the epigenetic nature of the 
regulatory mechanisms of gene expression; 2. The systematical questioning of 
preconceptions of ‘explanatory’ categories of behavior, such as ‘innate’ or 
‘programmed’; 3. Especially in psychological research the integration of the concepts of 
‘development’ and ‘learning’, and a richer classification of the concept of ‘environment’ 
in the production of behavior; 4. A fuller understanding of the nature of inheritance that 
transcends the restriction to the genetic material as the sole hereditary unit, and the 
study of the process of developmental niche construction; and last 5. Taking serious the 
role of ecology in development and evolution. I hope that an accomplishment of the 
above task will then lead to a ‘postgenomic’ synthesis of nature and nurture that 
conceptualizes ‘nature’ as the natural phenotypic outcome ‘nurtured’ by the natural 
developmental process leading to it.  
 
Introduction  
 
A scientific understanding of the nature and history of living beings depends crucially on 
our understanding of the most basic of biological processes that brought them about: 
development. Since ancient times this process has captured the imagination of scholars 
but has eluded a satisfactory explanation or consistent framework until today. From the 
beginning, the main problem in the interpretation of development has been the question 
of whether organisms are the result of the emergence of structures and processes not 
entirely predictable from the undifferentiated properties of the embryo, or whether they 
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merely unfold or mature out of something preformed or predetermined from the 
beginning. The term development with its literal meaning of ‘unfolding’ unfortunately 
suggests this latter interpretation. Today’s received view of development attempts to 
reconcile both visions: a (multicellular) organism begins as one cell packed with ‘innate’ 
information of how to build the phenotype, from which the final form emerges in 
interaction with the ‘acquired’ influences from the environment.  
 
This ‘interactionist consensus’, however, perpetuates the nature-nurture debate by 
maintaining its inherent dichotomy. Despite being declared dead many times, this debate 
is alive and well today in the dichotomy of nature as the genetic, and stable, factors of 
development, and nurture as the environmental, and plastic influences (Kitcher, 2001). 
The term nature is applied to those traits that seem genetically determined, fixed in their 
final form and are present in all cultures, as in discussion about Human Nature; the term 
nurture, on the other hand, implies variable rearing conditions, including human culture. 
In contrast to this received view, I want to promote the idea that all traits, no matter how 
developmentally fixed or universal they seem, contingently develop out of a single-cell 
state through the interaction of a multitude of developmental resources that defies any 
easy, dichotomous separation. 
 
One of the foremost aims of a new conception of development is therefore to challenge 
the widely held view that the physiological or behavioral phenotype derives from either 
nature or nurture, or from both nature and nature. Both the exclusive and the additive 
model make no biological sense whatsoever, since no genetic factor can properly be 
studied independent of, or just in addition to, the environment. The same is true for the 
environment, which in itself is a concept that includes a wide variety of very different 
causes and factors, from the genomic environment of a gene, over its chromatin 
packaging and cellular context, up to ecological, social and cultural influences upon the 
whole organism. The message of this paper will be that the familiar dichotomies, of 
which many are so fond, stand in the way when attempting to study and understand 
development. Those different dichotomies, such as innate-acquired, inherited-learned, 
gene-environment, biology-culture, and nature-nurture, are not just inappropriate labels in 
themselves but they do not map neatly onto each other: genes do not equal innate, 
biology, or nature, and neither does the environment stand for acquired, culture, or 
nurture. So-called innate traits include effects of the organism’s extended inheritance of 
epigenetic factors, which are reliably reproduced with the help of ontogenetic niche 
construction. As a matter of fact, no developmental factor coincides with either nature or 
nurture, or so I contend. Instead I advocate new and scientifically more useful 
distinctions between developmental resources, and ultimately promote the understanding 
of ‘nature’ as the natural phenotypic outcome ‘nurtured’ by the natural developmental 
process leading to it.  
 
The papers of this issue are the outcome of an international symposium on “Reconciling 
nature and nature in behavior and cognition research” in March 2007 at Indiana 
University, organized by Colin Allen and myself and funded by Indiana University. Part 
of its objective was to explore interdisciplinary frontiers in this controversy that may as 
well promise new insights into the human condition and the idea of ‘human nature’ (see 
the papers by Robert and Machery in this issue). It was not our intent to have the 
speakers, who came from different sub-disciplines of cognitive science (including 
philosophy and biology), merely debate why a certain behavior or cognitive competence 
is due to either nature or nurture, but instead to use the symposium as an opportunity to 
reflect on the empirical, semantic, conceptual, methodological/epistemological and 
metaphysical issues that may help to resolve this unhealthy debate. The symposium, we 
hoped, would provide the perfect venue to think aloud about new directions current 
research should take and how the proposed directions could be integrated. The current 
issue is the outcome of these reflections. 
 
To resolve the nature-nurture debate with a newly emerging view of development several 
distinct but related sub-problems need to be addressed (Stotz, 2006a) that I shall 
introduce and discuss in this paper:  
1) An understanding of development requires a deep knowledge not only of the 
sequences of the genome but of their regulated expression. A realistic view of gene 
activation is of pivotal importance since better than any other developmental process it 
manifests in detail the intricate interaction between genetic material and other 
developmental factors (Stotz, 2006a, 2006b). In addition, a fully mechanistic picture 
guards against conflating explanations of the role of genes in development with an 
explanation of the complete process of development.  
2) We need to systematically question preconceptions of ‘explanatory’ categories of 
behavior, such as innate, acquired, genetically determined or programmed, or even just 
ascriptions such as ‘genetic’ trait or disease, all of which obscure the necessity of 
investigating developmental processes in order to gain insight into the actual mechanisms 
of behavior (see Moore this issue). In addition such preconceptions are prone to commit 
the ‘phylogenetic fallacy’, which conflates evolutionary and developmental explanations. 
The classical research technique to divide the ‘innate’ from the ‘acquired’ are so-called 
‘deprivation experiments’, in which the exposure of the developing organism to certain –
mostly ‘obvious’ – environmental parameters are controlled. However, it does not 
provide evidence for some general property of ‘independence of the environment. 
Restricted housing of cowbirds, for instance, reveals innate artifacts without illuminating 
actual developmental pathways (see West and King, this issue; Griffiths and Machery, 
this issue; but also Weinberg and Mallon, this issue). 
3) Especially in psychological research the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘learning’ 
need to be integrated instead of being studied in isolation and by distinct research 
traditions (see for instance Jones, this issue; Moore, this issue). This involves a richer 
classification of the influence of the environment starting with basic environmental 
influences, e.g. of gene expression or cellular behavior, over low-level sensory processes 
and real individual experience, to full-fledged individual and social learning (Stotz & 
Allen, Forthcoming). Careful investigations of the origin of behavior demonstrate the 
need to distinguish between bioavailability as opposed to simple exposure to stimulation. 
The distinction is between what an animal has the capacity to do as opposed to how 
social/ perceptual systems function to gate what is available to be learned (see for 
instance West and King, this issue). 
4) We require further a fuller understanding of the nature of inheritance that transcends 
the restriction to the genetic material as the sole hereditary unit. Instead, heredity must be 
more widely understood as the processes providing transgenerational stability through the 
reliable availability of developmental resources in the next generation either through its 
transmission or reproduction. This includes maternal and paternal (parental) effects, 
epigenetic factors in a narrow and wide sense, behavioral, cultural and symbolic 
inheritance systems. Many of these processes come together to form the ontogenetic 
niche for the offspring (see West and King, this issue; Jablonka and Lamb, this issue; 
Alberts, this issue). 
5) Ideas such as (developmental) niche construction and adaptive phenotypic plasticity, 
and the discussion of the difference between mere exposure to stimulation versus 
bioavailability suggest that ecological validity will be an indispensable factor for 
studying development and evolution, and how both processes interact with each other. 
The long history of reliance on restricted investigative methods in combination with 
highly insensitive model organisms has given genetic explanation unwarranted 
dominance by masking the prevalence of nonlinear interactive effects between a 
multitude of developmental resources (see West and King, this issue; Robert, this issue). 
Also, a wider understanding of inheritance that often relies on the provisioning by 
organisms underscores the importance of development for answering evolutionary 
questions (Jablonka and Lamb, this issue). 
6) A new epigenetic understanding of development encompassing the organism in its 
developmental niche takes seriously the idea that all traits, even those conceived as 
‘innate’, have to develop out of a single-cell state through the interaction between genetic 
and other resources of development. Such a view should ultimately resolve the 
dichotomy between preformationism and epigenesis, and instead provide us with a real 
postgenomic2 synthesis of development, evolution and heredity.  
 
1. Molecular Epigenesis 
 
“A true appreciation of development will never emerge without a focus on the genome 
and its regulation by the environment, and it is precisely this field of biology that most 
forcefully demonstrates that the mere presence of a genetic variant, in all but the 
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extreme cases, is not sufficient to explain variation at the level of the phenotype. ... It 
is not the mere presence of a gene that is of functional importance, but rather its 
expression. […] The structure of the genome highlights the importance of gene-
environment interaction.” (Meaney, 2004: 5) 
 
Genuine understanding of development depends on a knowledge not merely of the 
sequence of the genome, but of the regulated differential expression of these sequences. 
Genetic activity is involved in most biological processes, but so are non-genetic 
activities. Explanations that list only interacting genes are vacuous, or at the very least 
one-sided and incomplete. Postgenomic biology has brought with it a new conception of 
the ‘reactive genome’ – rather than the active gene – which is activated and regulated by 
cellular processes that include signals from the internal and external environment (Stotz, 
2006a, 2006b). This is not the place to report in detail results that have only very recently 
come to light concerning the mind-numbing complexities of the expression of genes 
during development; instead a few examples should suffice. The last decade of whole-
genome sequencing led to the formulation of the so-called N-value paradox that the 
number of genes does not increase to match increases in organismal complexity. Instead, 
the ratio of non-coding DNA rises, and so does the number of functional, regulatory roles 
played by non-coding DNA and RNA that help to translate, with the active help of 
instructive environmental signals, sequential information encoded in the genome into 
developmental complexity (Mattick, 2004). In other words, the more complex an 
organism, the more complex the expression of its limited number of coding sequences. 
This lends support to Michael Meaney’s conclusion that what is of particular importance 
during development is not the existence of some genes but their differential time- and 
tissue-dependent expression. In the last two decades development has become equated 
with differential gene expression, but what is hidden behind this equation is the complex 
network of molecules other than DNA (such as proteins and metabolites), cellular 
structures, 3-dimensional cellular assemblages and other higher-level structures that 
control or are otherwise involved not only in the differential expression of genes but in a 
wide range of other developmental processes decoupled from the direct influence of 
DNA sequences. 
 
In eukaryotes, DNA is part of a densely packed chromatin structure, which allows it to fit 
neatly into the nucleus, but which is also a major mechanism to control gene expression. 
The DNA’s weak chemical bond to the histone proteins, around which it is tightly 
wrapped to form nucleosomes like beads on a string, needs to be broken down in order to 
free the DNA molecule to undergo new bonds with transcription factors. Hence the 
default position of DNA in eukaryotes is no expression unless expression is activated. 
Several large complexes of transcription factors and several other accessory proteins such 
as chromatin remodeling factors are needed in order to proceed with the transcription of a 
stretch of DNA. Beyond the activation of DNA an ever-expanding array of processing 
and targeting mechanisms are coming into play that not only determine the final gene 
product but which amplify the repertoire of protein products specified through the 
eukaryotic genome. We have to understand that genes are not straightforward, 
structurally- or functionally-defined entities, or even mixed functional-structural entities. 
Instead, genes are ‘‘things an organism can do with its genome’’ (Stotz, 2006b: 905): 
they are ways in which cells utilize available template resources to create biomolecules 
that are needed in a specific place at a specific time. The same DNA sequence potentially 
leads to a large number of different gene products and the need for a rare product calls for 
the assembly of novel mRNA sequences. Hence the information for a product is not 
simply encoded in the DNA sequence but has to be read into that sequence by 
mechanisms that go beyond the sequence itself. Certain coding sequences, plus 
regulatory and intronic sequences, are targeted by transcription, splicing, and editing 
factors (proteins and functional RNAs), which in turn are cued by specific environmental 
signals. Regulatory mechanisms determine not only whether a sequence is transcribed, 
but where transcription starts and ends, how much of the sequence will be transcribed, 
which coding and noncoding regions will be spliced out, how and in which order the 
remaining coding sequences will be reassembled, which nucleotides will be substituted, 
deleted, or inserted, and whether and how the remaining sequence will be translated. 
Many of these mechanisms do not simply produce alternative protein-coding transcripts. 
A sequence may be transcribed into several parallel, coding, and noncoding transcripts. 
The factors that interactively regulate genomic expression are far from mere background 
conditions or supportive environment; rather they are on a par with genetic information 
since they co-specify the linear sequence of the gene product together with the target 
DNA sequence. Networks of genome regulation, including several different kinds of gene 
products and instructional environmental resources, specify a range of products from a 
gene through the selective use of nucleotide sequence information and, more radically, 
the creation of nucleotide sequence information. This thesis of “molecular epigenesis” 
argues that even at the molecular level no strict preformationism is warranted since gene 
products are not specified through DNA sequences alone (Stotz, 2006a). 
 
I again would like to stress the importance of environmental factors in most mechanisms 
of gene expression. Even though one might argue that most work is done by proteins and 
other gene products, it generally holds for all eukaryotes that  
“in the absence of their respective inducing signal, transcriptional regulators tend not 
to be found in the nucleus with (in the case of activators) their activating regions free 
to work. Rather, activating regions are masked … or … the regulators are maintained 
outside of the nucleus, until the inducing signal is detected”. (Ptashne & Gann, 2002: 
67). 
Many genes require for their differential activation and selection the integration of a 
proper combination of several environmental signals, and this combination of signals, 
together with the presence of a particular combinations of activational factors, controls 
which exact sequence will be transcribed, and how much. It will also affect 
cotranscriptional processes such as alternative splicing and RNA editing. The ‘same’ 
genes can therefore be expressed in many distinctive ways by different set of signals and 
activators. 
 
These complicating factors of gene expression are not the only reason why it is important 
not to regard development as nothing but gene action and activation. Genes have an 
important role in development, but their role can be properly understood only within the 
larger system that holds controlling influence over them. Jason Scott Robert summarizes 
this attitude: 
“To take development seriously is to take development as our primary explanandum, 
to resist the substitution of genetic metaphors for developmental mechanisms … The 
translation of embryology’s hard problem (how a specific organism arises from a 
single, relatively homogenous cell) into a problem about gene action and activation 
generates explanations at the level of genes; but these explanations solve (or, rather, 
begin to solve) the subsidiary problem of the role of genes in development, not the 
problem of development as such. … There is indeed good reason to believe that 
genetics reduces to development, and not the other way around.” (Robert, 2004: 22) 
 
2. The Reconceptualization of ‘Explanatory’ Concepts and Categories of Behavior 
 
This section attempts to analyze a few overused concepts, dichotomies, metaphors, and 
shorthand formulations that are commonly used in the explanation of behavior. It claims 
that these, instead of being useful characterizations of behavior or shorthand 
classificatory schemes they sidestep deep explanatory analyses of developmental 
processes and therefore prevent useful and necessary further research into the nature and 
origin of characteristics or traits that we want to explain. To name just a few of such 
explanatory concepts: Nature-nurture; innateness; interaction; information; program; 
inheritance; gene action; maturation; genes-and-environment. I advocate here the 
replacement of these placeholders by real explanations with specified mechanisms of 
developmental interaction. 
 
The main problem with all allegedly explanatory categories and concept of behavior, 
such as instinctive, learned, or genetically programmed, is that they block further 
investigations into the real ontogenetic and evolutionary causes of a behavior just by their 
very nature of purporting to explain while really doing nothing but labeling it. After 
careful and often arduous empirical investigation, all apparently ‘innate’ processes 
operating to regulate behavior have turned out to involve epigenetic or experiential 
factors (Blumberg, 2005). As Paul Griffiths has argued, the vernacular concept of 
innateness can imply three different and unrelated things, namely the developmental 
fixity (non-involvement of experience), species-typicality or universality, and 
adaptedness or normativity of a trait (Griffiths, 2002; see also Griffiths & Machery, this 
issue; Weinberg & Mallon, this issue). All three of these are sometimes equated with 
genetic determination. Beside the fact that I want to argue against the existence of any 
genetically determined trait; a deeper investigation of these three characteristics is able to 
show their relative independence of each other (Griffiths, Machery, & Linquist, 
Submitted). Evolutionary adaptations need not be developmentally fixed, independent of 
life experience, and hard to change but can instead be phenotypically plastic, as is the 
case with many highly environmentally sensitive polyphenisms, distinct phenotypes that 
are elicited by different environmental conditions (see below section 4). Nor do 
adaptations need to be species-typical or universal, since they can result from frequency-
dependent selection, where a trait is only adaptive if a certain percentage of the 
population carries it. Species-typical or universal traits are not necessarily the result of 
natural selection but can be dictated by strong physical or developmental constraints that 
render them hard or even impossible to change, as for instance been shown by many 
examples uncovered by the new “physicoevolutionary” approach, or by research into the 
homologies of organisms (Gilbert, 2003; Newman, 2003). Last but not least, universality 
need not be and often is not due to the developmental fixity or experience-independence 
of a trait. It may be, and often is due to the reliability of certain experiences, which the 
organism needs to have to develop a trait. Song learning in many bird species is a case in 
point. In some species of birds, such as the brown-headed cowbird, all birds of a 
population sing the same song (while in many others the songs of individuals may differ 
substantially, such as in the Australian Lyre bird, or the Indian Common Mynah). While 
such instances have formerly been taken as support for the genetic determination of song 
‘learning’, we now know that all individuals have to be exposed to other members of 
their species in order to acquire their population-specific song. The story in cowbirds, 
which are nest parasites and are therefore not even raised by their own parents or even a 
member of their own species, is even more complicated and intriguing than with birds 
which acquire the song from their parents, but the details of how they acquire their song 
need not interest us here. Suffice it to say that cowbirds nevertheless always learn to sing 
the particular dialect of the population they belong to because of the reliability with 
which they meet, recognize, and flock with members of their own species and are 
therefore exposed to the right stimulating experience when maturing (Freeberg, West, 
King, Duncan, & Sengelaub, 2002; West, King, & Duff, 1990). 
 
The use of metaphors can be understood as another form of stand-in for a full-fledged 
explanation in causal terms. A metaphor is a rhetorical trope that enhances a description 
of a subject through the application of implicit and explicit attributes from a well-known 
subject taken from a different domain. The use of a metaphor tacitly involves and 
assumes as valid all the familiar logical implications, consequences and interrelations 
between the concepts used and metaphors” and the described concept (Kurakin, 2005: 
46). A famous example is the ascription of properties of a ‘program’ to genes, the 
genome or the genotype. Since the beginning of molecular genetics coincided with the 
beginning of the informational and computational era this seemed to be a natural move. 
The postgenomic era, however, brought with it an insight in the structural complexity of 
the genome and the heterogeneity of the genetic material to which a computational and 
also a classico-mechanistic interpretation seem illfitted. More appropriate seems  
“an alternative conceptualization of cell differentiation and development (…) where 
the developing organism is viewed as a dynamic self-organizing system of adaptive 
interacting agents. This alternative interpretation appears to be more consistent with a 
probabilistic nature of gene expression and the phenomena of cell plasticity, and is 
coterminus with the novel emerging image of the cell as a self-organizing molecular 
system” (Kurakin, 2005: 46).  
The program metaphor, however, has stuck. This metaphor inspired generations of 
biologist to describe whole cellular or organismic behavior in terms of gene networks and 
programs (Luscombe et al., 2004; Weber, Polen, Heuveling, Wendisch, & Hengge, 2005; 
Wilkins, 2008). In his philosophical gloss on this kind of biological work Alexander 
Rosenberg claims that the development of Drosophila can be exhaustedly described in a 
‘Drosophila developmental program’ following “Boolean switching rules in a small 
number of relatively simple linear programs”. Rosenberg writes: “It bears emphasis that I 
do not mean this claim to be metaphorical. As I shall illustrate and then argue, the genes 
literally program the construction of the Drosophila embryo in the way the software in a 
robot program the welding of the chassis of an automobile” (Rosenberg, 2006: 61-2). 
Rosenberg disregards the fact that models of gene networks such as the ones reproduced 
in his book are in reality only a convenient shorthand for the elucidation of functional co-
dependencies of genes, and an intentional simplification of the reality of these 
dependencies. There is no mention that this shortcut collapses a multi-molecular network, 
which includes genes, regulatory DNA sequences, a large variety of gene products, intra- 
and extra-environmental signals, and the contingent history of the cell, onto a single 
dimension of structural and regulatory (protein-coding) genes. This is deliberate, because 
it makes the genome appear to constitute a program (with the exception that genetic 
‘programs’ rarely ever crash like computer programs!). It also has to be acknowledged 
that Boolean models offer only a rather crude representation of real world gene networks 
in that they can only describe discrete, instead of continuous changes in the cell (Schlitt 
& Brazma, 2006).  
 
The time- and tissue-dependent activation, selection and even creation of the relevant 
nucleic acid sequences from the ‘same gene’ requires, among other necessary factors, 
instructional environmental resources. The regulatory network integrates many different 
aspects of cell activity (transport, cytoplasmic enzyme activities, and energy metabolism) 
into the transcriptional and posttranscriptional decision. This makes it literally impossible 
to separate physiology from genomic regulation in any living cells (Shapiro, 1999). The 
common assumption of predetermination inherent in many such descriptions of gene 
action begs the question of what determines changes in a sequence of activities; it is 
always the model rather than the reality which seems to suggest a dictatorial rather than a 
democratic vision of cell action. I want to argue that what appears as a ‘program’ is 
constituted a posteriori by a network of interactions within the whole cell.  
 
There are of course no hard-core genetic determinists around who would seriously 
dispute the necessity of any ‘environment’ for the production of a trait. A more common 
version defends genetic determinism against a background of a ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ 
environment in which a gene is tightly correlated with a behavioral trait. In many such 
cases elucidating the details about a ‘normal’ environment – instead of just taking it for 
granted – would have shown how much the organism or its parents must invest in order 
to reliably provide the stable environmental resources that allow for a predictable pattern 
of gene expression (i.e. a tight correlation between gene and trait). I will turn to the 
importance of developmental niche construction in section 4. Here I only use the notion 
to provide further support for the idea that similar to a self-organized ant colony, agency 
is located neither in the genome nor the environment but in the organization of all factors 
in an intricate network.  
 
3. Understanding and Integrating Development, Learning, Experience and 
Environment 
 
In the last decade it has become fashionable for cognitive comparative psychologists to 
study animal behavior in an ‘integrated’ fashion to account for both the ‘innate’ and the 
‘acquired’. I argue that these studies of the animal learning against an evolutionary 
background, instead of really integrating the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, rather 
cement this old dichotomy. They combine empty nativist interpretations of behavior 
systems with blatantly environmentalist explanations of behavior acquisition. While in 
some areas of biology interest in the relationship between behavior and development has 
surged through topics such as parental effects, extragenetic inheritance, and phenotypic 
plasticity, this has gone almost completely unnoticed in the study of animal behavior in 
comparative psychology, and is frequently ignored in (cognitive) ethology too. Reasons 
for this may include the traditional focus on the function of behavior in its species-
specific form in adult animals, which can favor a preformationist or deterministic 
conception of development, or generally the separation of psychology from biology. In 
psychology the process of learning is often set against the maturational unfolding of the 
young to the adult instead of being understood as part and parcel of behavioral 
development, either as a process that drives or explains certain developments, or a 
process influenced by other developmental processes. One of the necessary prerequisites 
to the integration of nature with nurture is to clarify the relationship between the concepts 
of learning and development, and to investigate whether and how both concepts can be 
usefully deployed in the study of animal behavior. This will require the full integration of 
the concept of learning into a much wider concept of individual experience, or if this term 
is itself already understood as a higher-order sensory process only applicable to higher 
organisms, then another more basic concept such as sensation or sensing (Ginsburg & 
Jablonka, 2007).  
 
What has all this talk about biological development to do with cognitive or behavioral 
phenomena? The symbolic approach of ‘good old-fashioned artificial intelligence’ 
(GOFAI) (Haugeland, 1985) that sees a principled distinction between the cognitive and 
the non-cognitive, or the mind and the body, investigates cognitive processes as if they 
were disembodied and decoupled from the world and consisting of symbolic 
manipulation of abstract and enduring mental representations of events in the world. This 
representational stance can’t or won’t deal with the emergence of such symbolic 
representation out of biological processes, and therefore usually goes hand in hand with a 
nativist understanding of development. In contrast, the embodiment and dynamical 
systems paradigm understands cognition as emergent, embodied, embedded, situated, and 
softly assembled action, and attempts to break down the distinction between sensorimotor 
activity and cognition. In other words, this view is much more conducive to the 
epigenetic understanding of life and history proposed by the developmental systems 
perspective that refuses to partition the phenotype into genetic, morphological, 
psychological and social levels. These two related perspectives, both of which focus on 
explanations of how novel properties can emerge, complement each other: they 
investigate ‘behavior’ as the product of development but also as the process through 
which development takes place. On the one hand, the developmental systems theory 
grounds cognition in developmental processes. On the other hand, dynamical systems 
theory attempts to ground development in cognitive processes.  
 
Questions about which species are capable of which forms of learning are typically 
treated as if organisms come to the task as fully-formed representatives of their species.  
Thus questions about, for example, the imitative capacities of primates rarely take 
individual development into account (Jones, 2005, see also Jones, this issue).  In fact, it is 
widely believed on the basis of non-developmental studies that monkeys aren't capable of 
genuine imitation. But the importance of development is underscored by experiential 
findings with human-reared or enculturated apes that show the differential effects of 
enculturation in human socio-cultural environments on the development of a whole range 
of capacities in great apes. Among those are many that are theoretically consigned to 
humans alone, such as mental representational capacities and a whole range of social 
cognitive capacities like intentional understanding, empathy, and ‘true imitation’ (see 
also Bering, 2004; Call & Tomasello, 1996; Furlong, Boose, & Boyson, 2007; Tomasello 
& Call, 2004). In a recent paper Povinelli and collaborators strongly urge taking the 
discontinuities between humans and apes more seriously, especially those regarding 
higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system. However, just 
as with most of traditional cognitive science, they confound cultural symbolic 
achievements with individual cognitive competencies. By not allowing any explicit role 
for learning and development their core rationale for claiming a discontinuity between 
human and on-human primates rests on a hybrid symbolic-connectionist, formal model of 
cognition, LISA. Such models are criticized by an embodied stance as a quite unrealistic 
model of cognitive growth (McGonigle & Chalmers, In Press; Penn, Holyoak, & 
Povinelli, In Press). 
 
In most work within comparative psychology, the basic classificatory scheme is 
methodological and not tied to recognizing the shortcomings of the operationalism 
underlying the traditional classification scheme.  For instance, Grau & Joynes argue for a 
‘neurofunctionalist’ approach, which seeks to classify learning in terms of both neural 
mechanisms and adaptive function. Their results with rat spinal cords suggest that even in 
the spinal cord, “experience” has lasting effects on the capacity of neurons to respond 
adaptively to future environmental conditions. The basic cellular mechanisms for 
learning and memory are highly conserved between invertebrates and vertebrates (Burrell 
& Sahley, 2001) and may even go further back in evolutionary history. Furthermore, the 
NMDA receptors involved in the synaptic plasticity of neurons use proteins for binding 
amino acids that are highly conserved from bacteria (Kuryatov, Laube, Betz, & Kuhse, 
1994). Even the simplest organisms, bacteria, respond differently to similar 
configurations of cues in their surroundings on the basis of their specific life experiences. 
But the concept of bacterial learning may be no more than a philosophical abstraction; do 
bacteria really learn? The answer you give, of course, depends very much on your 
definitions of learning and experience. Not if learning is restricted to organisms with 
nervous systems that connect sensory to motor systems, and that extract from the 
environment information for action (behavior narrowly defined). Possibly yes, if 
‘environment’ is understood as the source of a “quite heterogeneous mix of resources 
called experience” extracted by a wide variety of means, only one of which is sensory, 
and if knowledge and means for behavior derive from more than what is known to the 
senses (Moore, 2003: 350).  
 
Central to the project of synthesizing development and learning is to identify types or 
token of epigenetic interaction, the role of experience and learning in the development of 
particular traits and in development in general, and the role of development in the 
phenomenon of learning. We need to ground the process of learning in development, and 
development in cognitive processes. As Samuelson and Smith have noted, “coupling the 
dynamics of perceiving and remembering with the dynamics of development will lead us 
to a more complete theory of knowledge and its development” (Samuelson & Smith, 
2000: 98). From a psychobiological perspective, learning appears as a category within an 
overall framework of development as the lifelong, adaptive construction of the organism-
environment system. Taking the idea of phenotypic plasticity seriously may lead to a 
conception of development as a lifelong process of ‘learning’ or ‘acquiring’ an adaptive 
mode of living in a partially constructed environment. And learning as the acquisition of 
novel behavior and gain of knowledge about the environment becomes synonymous with 
developing. In a systems view of development learning is certainly just one among many 
processes in which experience influences behavior. This new synthesis should help to 
overcome the age-old dualism between the innate and the learned. Something may not be 
learned in the strict sense but it is still acquired in the sense that some environmental 
factors will have played a pivotal role in its origin. A trait may be learned and is still 
reliably reproduced generation after generation. This is not to say that there aren’t 
differences between developmental trajectories. It is to call for the development of 
scientifically more fruitful distinctions. 
 
4. From Extended Inheritance to Ontogenetic Niche Construction  
 
“The triumph of the reductionist path, from the instrumental particularization of 
heredity, through the hardening of the particles as material genes, to the resolution of 
the heredity material in molecular terms, could not, in the final analysis, provide the 
answer to the plight of inheritance. Heredity is a property immanent to living systems 
and needs the perspective of the life sciences.” (Falk, 2000: 339) 
 
Transgenerational stability need not rely on the faithful transmission of DNA alone. 
Natural selection selects for adaptive traits or phenotypes, which are always derived from 
the non-linear interaction among a range of diverse developmental resources. Their 
organization frequently exhibits phenotypic plasticity, a capacity that allows the organism 
to react adaptively to different environmental conditions (Pigliucci, 2001; West-
Eberhard, 2003). The stable inheritance of this adaptive phenotype depends on the 
reliable transmission of all the necessary developmental factors across generations. In 
other words, phenotypic plasticity relies on a stable ‘developmental niche’ which is 
faithfully reconstructed by the species, the parent and the organism itself (West & King, 
1987). The subject of selection is the whole developmental system (Oyama, Griffiths, & 
Gray, 2001b). 
 
Inheritance is the reliable availability of developmental resources for and in successive 
generations either through transmission or reconstruction. The rise of classical genetics 
produced the theory of the genetic material in the germ line as the only factors faithfully 
transmitted from parent to offspring; inheritance became synonymous with genetic 
inheritance. In section one I have argued for the thesis of molecular epigenesis: “Even for 
the clearest examples of molecular genes such as those traditionally thought to specify 
polypeptide sequence, epigenetic change ensures that nucleotide sequence alone is not 
sufficient to predict whether a polypeptide product will be produced or, if it is, what the 
resulting sequence of amino acids will be” (Burian, 2004: 60). Regulatory mechanisms of 
genome expression amplify the literal coding sequence of the ‘reactive genome’ by 
providing additional sequence specificity to the literal DNA sequence; this extends the 
range of constitutive epigenesis all the way down to the molecular level of sequence 
determination. Inheritance systems have evolved to make the transmission of crucial 
information from parents to offspring more reliable and enhance the offspring’s fitness. 
However, it is not so much the particular gene you inherit that counts, but when, where 
and how a particular sequence is transcribed or translated by the higher order network of 
gene regulation that controls the time- and tissue dependent expression of genes. As Matt 
Ridley has remarked, “the more we lift the lid on the human genome, the more vulnerable 
to experience genes appear to be” (Ridley, 2003: 3). Evolution’s answer to this plight of 
inheritance, or the parents’ answer to assert a more reliable influence on the fitness of 
their offspring, was to provide more than just genetic resources to the next generation, to 
construct a stable ‘niche for the genome’. West and King were one of the first to urge: 
“Ask not what’s inside the genes you inherited, but what the genes you inherited are 
inside of” (West & King, 1987: 552). Looking at the enormous complexity of gene 
expression of eukaryotes that reveals a very flexible and reactive genome open to many 
intra-and extra-organismal environmental influences, “it was simply a matter of time 
before some systems found ways to manage aspects of their own developmental 
environment” (Lucas, 2006 (ms)). In other words, many aspects of experience have 
evolutionary explanations, an insight shared by some of the most recent and some of the 
oldest contributors to evolutionary thought: 
“To the extent that there exists heritable variation among mothers in their ability to 
discern high-quality mates, pick an appropriate host to place seeds or eggs, or provide 
protection from predators, and so on, such traits are expected to evolve in much the 
same way as any other trait subject to the inevitable consequences of Darwinian 
natural selection”. (Mousseau & Fox, 1998: Preface v) 
 
“We live from birth to death in a world of persons and things which is in large 
measure what it is because of what has been done and transmitted from previous 
human activities. When this fact is ignored, experience is treated as if it were 
something which goes on exclusively inside an individual's body and mind. It ought 
not to be necessary to say that experience does not occur in a vacuum. There are 
sources outside an individual which give rise to experience.” (Dewey, 1938/1963: 39) 
 
The ontogenetic niche comprises all molecular, cellular, ecological and social 
circumstances inherited by the organism and includes all developmental factors that are 
reliably and dependably provided from one generation to the next. All these resources are 
indispensable for the successful reproduction of a developmental system. The 
construction of a developmental niche relies heavily on the extragenetic or extended 
inheritance of developmental resources. The great variety of inherited resources are made 
reliably available through epigenetic, behavioral, cultural and symbolic inheritance 
‘channels’ (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). These channels include maternal and paternal 
(parental) effects, which are defined as the causal influence of the parental phenotype, or 
the environment the parents’ experience, on offspring phenotype. Such effects are 
completely independent of the genes contributed to the offspring, and can also not be 
reduced to the influence of parental genes or RNAs, even though they can and do play a 
role in many instances. Parental effects are comprised of differential resource allocation 
either through egg size and composition, placental nutrition, or nursing; preference 
induction (oviposition, imprinting on food, habitat, and mates); mate choice; the non-
facultative and facultative imprinting of genes and reprogramming of gene expression 
through chromatin remodeling and DNA methylation (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; 
Mousseau & Fox, 2003). The cytoplasmic chemical gradients plus the messenger RNA 
and transcription factors, all of which are inherited with the mother’s egg, give the 
influence of the offspring’s gene expression a head start, but as the examples above show, 
the mother’s control over the fetus’ environment does not stop there. Even after birth 
rearing practices, such as the licking of pups by rat mothers; the facilitation of offspring 
experience through the creation of opportunities; and various forms of social learning 
continue to influence gene expression levels and other developmental processes. Parental 
activity can facilitate, guide and entrench social learning, which in the case of humans 
and higher animals falls under the rubric of the cultural and even symbolic ‘transmission 
of information’. 
 
There have been repeated attempts to reduce all of these mechanisms to the action of 
inherited or parent-of-origin genes, so that ultimately the real causes are all genetic. This 
special pleading fails in the light of the discovery that development relies less on the 
existence of genes in an organism than on the regulated expression of these genes, which 
ultimately depends on a host of environmental factors. Wherever there are genes there are 
extragenetic factors necessary for their regulated expression. 
 
I have called the design-like control of the next generation’s developmental environment 
extended inheritance or ontogenetic niche construction. What all of the above cases of 
inheritance through environment construction have in common is making the 
transmission of crucial information more reliable. And while some of the above 
mechanisms have at first sight not much in common with the construction of epistemic 
structures by an extended mind, in the latter cases of behavioral, ecological and cultural 
inheritance the biological shades smoothly into the cognitive.  
 
As Jablonka and Lamb have pointed out, epigenetic inheritance, just like genetic 
inheritance, is not just about reliability, stability and fixity, it can also lead to 
“transgenerationally extended plasticity, and developmentally-induced heritable 
epigenetic variations provide additional foci for selection” beyond genetically-induced 
heritable variations (Jablonka and Lamb, this issue). 
 
5. Ecological Evolutionary Developmental Biology  
 
The nature-nurture dichotomy is not reduced to the field of developmental biology and 
psychology but plays an important role in our conception of the process of evolution. One 
might even say that it was the very separation of nurture (germ line, genes) from nature 
(soma, environment, individual development) that cemented the exclusion of 
developmental biology from the Modern Synthesis of Evolution. The last two decades 
saw a growing interest in questions that the received view was not able to address, such 
as questions about patterns and processes of phenotypic evolution, and the origin of 
evolutionary novelty and innovation. A new synthesis of evolutionary developmental 
biology (evo-devo) began to form. From the Developmental Systems perspective, the 
elucidation of extended processes of inheritance made it clear that the reason to exclude 
so-called processes of nurture or individual development – for not producing heritable 
variation – no longer holds. Increasingly now, one hears that in order to situate a 
synthesis of development and evolution ‘in the real world’ the role of ecology needs to be 
fully integrated as well (Gilbert, 2001). 
 
The rise of the new science of Entwicklungsmechanik (developmental mechanics) in the 
late 19th and beginning of the 20th century regarded the anatomical tradition, with its 
evolutionary context and its methods of observation of developing organisms in their 
natural context, old-fashioned and unscientific, and completely rejected any (at that time 
regarded as) mystical ideas of epigenesis. The new mantra of experimentation with its 
new methodology of manipulating the animal in controlled laboratory settings brought 
the discipline of embryology, now called developmental biology, from the sea shore to 
the laboratory. Against this background we have to understand the emerging ‘model 
organism’ approach. To make animals constantly available and as uniform as possible, 
and the scientist independent from the dictate of seasonal availability and natural 
variability, laboratories started to breed their own animals. This constrained the choice of 
organism, which “must be selected for the inability of their development to be influenced 
by specific environmental cues”. In other words, “the influence of … environmental 
sources of phenotypic diversity were progressively eliminated under the physiological 
context of embryology” (Gilbert, 2003, 88f).  
 
While the physiological tradition favored the whole organism at the expense of the 
environment, the newly emerging genetics, especially molecular genetics, focused on 
genes at the expense of the organism. Also, the paradigm model organism of genetic 
research, Drosophila, showed such a remarkable robustness against the limited scale of 
environmental variables in the lab that the original conceptualization of genes in the 
Norm-of-Reaction approach shifted soon to genes as the only marker of phenotypic 
variation (Collins, Gilbert, Laubichler, & Müller, 2007). Both research traditions 
discounted and dispensed with the environment, the former the external niche of the 
organism and the latter the internal cellular niche of the genes and their expression. This 
shows an unexpected parallelism to the so-called ‘environmentalist’ movement in 
psychology that emerged at the same time. By moving the study of animal behavior and 
learning from the field and mere observational approaches into a laboratory that allowed 
for rigorous testing and experimentation, the behaviorist tradition dispensed with both the 
variety of organisms – after all, it presupposed the generality of learning mechanisms – 
and their natural habitat in favor of uniform organisms and controlled (environmental) 
test conditions. 
 
Recently this exclusion of the natural environment from experimental studies in 
evolutionary, developmental and also behavioral studies has been criticised, most notably 
by calls for an ‘ecological developmental biology’ or ‘Eco-Devo’ (Gilbert, 2001) and 
West and King’s call for a ‘Developmental Ecology’ (West, 2003; West and King, this 
issue). These criticisms included concerns about the use of model organisms and their 
limited generalizability for the interpretation of research results (see Robert, this issue). 
Together with growing research into parental effects these approaches have inspired a 
flood of new observations and experiments cementing the influential role of ecology on 
development and evolution. West and King’s surprising results in their extended research 
of the development of cowbirds warn us how a neglect of the natural, social conditions of 
flock living can mislead us in our interpretation of the developmental causes of behavior. 
Maternal effect research has produced many examples of how environmental conditions 
can exert an influence on the development of many successive generations (Gilbert, 
2001; Mousseau & Fox, 1998; West et al., 1990; see references in West & King, this 
issue). 
 
In summary, we can identify three reasons for the exclusion of development from the 
Modern Synthesis: a) The misconstruction of development as the mere unfolding or 
maturation of the organism out of its genetic ‘blueprint’ or’ program; b) The reduction of 
inheritance and transgenerational stability of traits to the transmission of genetic 
‘information’; and c) The neglect of the problem of evolutionary novelty, the so-called 
‘arrival of the fittest’. Taken together, these attitudes have not paid serious enough 
attention to the necessary and sufficient conditions for the process of adaptation by 
natural selection to take place: the origin of reliably reproducing developmental systems. 
In other words, evolutionary biology has hitherto failed to address the very possibility of 
evolution through the variability, adaptability and evolvability of phenotypes.  
 
The last decade has seen the emergence of multiple approaches that focus on the active 
role of organisms and their development in evolution. These accounts are Developmental 
Systems Theory (Oyama et al., 2001b), Extended Inheritance (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005), 
evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) (Hall, 2000) and developmental 
evolution (Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000), ecological developmental biology or Eco-
Devo (Gilbert, 2001), phenotypic and developmental plasticity (Pigliucci, 2001; West-
Eberhard, 2003), and Niche Construction (Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003). I 
believe that the concept of developmental niche construction has the power to integrate 
many if not most of the ideas laid down in the other approaches. The central idea behind 
developmental niche construction, and developmental systems theory, is the 
developmental system. It unifies many of the pressing questions and ideas mentioned 
above: the developmental system as the subject of evolution and their forces; the 
developmental system as the producer of evolutionary innovations; the interdependency 
and codetermination of the organism and its niche; the developmental system as the 
provider of many different interdependent channels of inheritance that reliably make 
available the necessary developmental resources for the reproduction of successive 
generations of developmental systems.  Research in the process of developmental niche 
construction can elucidate three main evolutionary questions:  
 
a) The origin of a trait by introducing new epigenetic resources for variation and 
innovation beyond mutation and recombination and describing how developmental 
processes situated in their ecological niche can produce novel phenotypes; b) the spread 
of a trait by showing in detail how organisms or their parental generation co-construct a 
selective environment; and c) the maintenance of a trait through processes of 
transgenerational stability of variation that extend the inheritance through the 
transmission of genetic material with the reliable availability of necessary developmental 
resources through multiple mechanisms of reproduction or transmission.  
 
We now have all necessary ingredients for a real postmodern or postgenomic synthesis of 
development, heredity and evolution. 
 
6. A Postgenomic Synthesis: an Epigenetic Understanding of Development 
 
The ‘century of the gene’ (Keller, 2000) spawned a new and more sophisticated 
preformationism, with the homunculus as the preformed ‘form’ of the organism replaced 
by the ‘information’ to make an organism encoded in the genome. This modern 
consensus accepts the emergence of qualitative change in development, which it explains 
with the preformed inherited genetic program as a materialized vital force directing the 
epigenesis of the organism out of a seemingly homogenous mass. Hence the new 
conception is rather a kind of ‘animistic’ predeterminism, where genes ‘program’ 
outcomes. True to the spirit of today’s interactionism the mainstream ‘modern consensus’ 
can be “standardly construed as the epigenesis of something preformed in the DNA” 
(Robert, 2004: 34). Instead of avoiding the unscientific dangers of both preformation and 
vitalist epigenesis, however, it combines, the shortcomings of these age-old ideas and 
rests ultimately on an unrealistic conception of genes and gene action.  
 
In its place I want to promote what others have called ‘probabilistic, contingent, or 
constitutive epigenesis’, a systems view that understands development as an epigenetic 
process of qualitative change based on the orderly emergence of novel behavioral traits 
during development without recourse to either an internal or external, preexisting plan. 
Taking development seriously is demanded by its contingent nature due to the immense 
importance of experiential factors at all stages of development, via the environmental 
regulation of gene expression.  This ranges from the chemically facilitated emergence of 
new behavior (like sucking in rats, see Alberts’ paper, this issue), to individual learning 
of new behaviors through various processes including trial and error and social learning 
(such as the emulation or real imitation of new solutions to problems, as shown by the 
tool use in chimp and crows), and includes “ultra-
participation, instruction, and formal schooling (as in the acquisition of language) 
(Gottlieb, 2001; Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Michel 
& Moore, 1995; Oyama et al., 2001b; Robert, 2004). 
 
What a new account of development really has to accomplish is not just to go beyond 
these vexed dichotomies such as innate and learned, but to provide a framework that 
integrates a complex set of heterogeneous factors into a system of developmental 
resources all of which are reliably reproduced in succeeding generations of a 
developmental system but none of which really belong alone to either ‘gene’, ‘organism’ 
or ‘environment’ (the famous “Triple Helix” of Richard Lewontin, 2000). Its 
contextualization of genes should obviate “even naïve temptations toward 
gene/environment dichotomies, and … will open up a very rich area of empirical 
investigations to examination and conceptualization in developmental-system terms. … 
Ultimately, such a view should work towards “overcoming inner/outer dichotomies in 
favor of self-organizing, causally reciprocal systems of interaction” (Moss, 2001: 85). 
Developmental Systems Theory (DST), an alternative approach to the integration of 
evolution, development and inheritance, provides just such a framework and its 
conception of development is basically the one promoted in this paper (for a short 
introduction in its central tenets see Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2001a).  
 
The important systems features of such a view are the rejection of dichotomous 
description of behavior in favor of a full analysis in terms of continuing interaction 
between, and the joint determination by, heterogeneous developmental resources. 
Learning may be involved but only as part of an overall concept of experience which 
includes less obvious contributions, such as self-stimulation. An important part of such an 
analysis implies seeing behavior as belonging to the organism’s overall anatomical and 
physiological make-up. A dynamical systems view of locomotor development 
exemplifies such an approach very well by including the growth of muscles and the 
infant’s strength in an account of behavioral coordination of movement (e.g., Thelen, 
1995). Other important features are the context sensitivity and developmental 
contingency of any factor, including genetic factors; the distributed control of 
development upon its heterogeneous resources, and the acknowledgement of the role 
played by the developmental system to control its further development; extending the 
idea of inheritance to include factors other than DNA, including factors formerly thought 
of as ‘environmental’ or ‘experiential’ if they are reliably reproduced or ‘passed on’ for 
succeeding generations; and last but not least the reconceptualization of development 
(and evolution) as the interactive construction in a thoroughly epigenetic account of 
development that “never sidesteps the task of explaining how a developmental outcome is 
produced” (Oyama et al., 2001a: 4). 
 
Alleged explanatory categories of behavior such as ‘innate’, ‘acquired’, ‘programmed’, 
‘hard-wired’, or ‘instinctive’ don’t really explain the origin of the behavior. Worse, by 
their presumptuous nature they preclude further investigation into the real causes of the 
trait, which are never just genetic or environmental but are necessarily ‘epigenetic’ by 
nature. This broad conception of epigenesis is expressed succinctly by Eva Jablonka: 
 
“Epigenetics … focuses on the general organizational principles of developmental 
systems, on the phenotypic accommodation processes underlying plasticity and 
canalization, on differentiation and cellular heredity, on learning and memory 
mechanisms. Epigenetics includes the study of the transmission of subsequent 
generations of developmentally-derived differences between individuals, thereby 
acknowledging the developmental aspect of heredity.” (Jablonka, pers. comm., cited 
in Gottlieb, 2001) 
 
The last decade has witnessed enormous scientific advances in genomics, systems 
biology, social neuroscience, evolutionary, and ecological and developmental biology 
(‘evo-devo’, ‘eco-devo’, phenotypic plasticity, niche construction, extragenetic 
inheritance, developmental systems theory). They challenge overly gene-
centered/predeterministic and environmentalist explanations of behavior. Nature and 
nurture don’t interact as if they were separated entities, with nature as the a priori plan 
being separated from concrete living and nurture being the means for modifying nature’s 
plan through experience. Every trait develops out of the nonlinear interactions among a 
range of very diverse developmental resources that cannot be usefully divided into 
genetic and non-genetic resources. It starts with the environmental regulation of gene 
expression, continues over a range of experiences beneath the skin and above the gene, 
through stages of sensory and social learning in vertebrates, to the exquisitely sensitive 
learning capacities of the human brain. ‘Nurture’ is this ongoing process of development, 
while ‘nature’ is the natural outcome of the organism-environment-system (Oyama, 
1999). 
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